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## THE MONROE DOCTRINE ABROAD IN 1823-24.<sup>1</sup>

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The chief purpose of this paper is to consider briefly the reception accorded President Monroe's message to congress of December 2, 1823, in England, France, Spain, and Austria.

This state paper was given a hearty welcome by many English journalists. Reports of the president's message first appeared in the newspapers of London on December 26 and 27, 1823. The *Times* happily contrasted it with "King's Speeches, addressed in like manner, but in substance far unlike, to Lords and Commons, to Peers and Deputies, in kingdoms nearer home. . . . As sources of intelligence—as indications of policy—as keys to national history, they have of late years dwindled to nothing, realizing with curious accuracy Talleyrand's definition of the use of language—'an instrument for concealing men's thoughts.' The genius of a popular Government rejects these mysterious devices. . . . The President's message of the United States is a paper breathing business in every line. It is at once a picture of the period elapsed since the labours of Congress were last interrupted, a prospectus for the forthcoming year, the detailed report of a commissioner, and the formal account of a trustee . . . we have read this State Paper with an interest more profound than any of its precursors had excited. The foreign relations of the United States are at this moment so deeply involved with those of Europe, of South America, and of England, that we turned impatiently to that division of the Message, and it well repaid us. There are two passages to which we shall especially direct the attention of the reader; one seems designed as a warning to

<sup>1</sup> This paper was originally prepared for a joint session of the American Historical Association and the American Political Science Association at Buffalo on December 29, 1911, where it was read under the title of "Europe and Spanish America in 1822-1824."

Russia—the other to those Powers who meditate, or may attempt, an interference hostile to the freedom of South America or of Mexico.” After quoting the clauses relating to Russia and to colonization in America, the *Times* said: “Now, this grave and somewhat novel doctrine, being connected by Mr. Monroe himself with the subject matter of the dispute with Russia, touching an occupation of the northwestern shore of North America, looks to us as if the Cabinet of Washington, had determined to carry its resistance to the famous ukase for monopolizing as well the ocean as the coast beyond the mere maritime branch of the controversy; and to exhibit some grounds of opposition to the establishment of Russian colonies on the shores of the northwest continent and of its adjacent islands. There is little doubt that if such be the design at Washington, full power exists to carry it into execution, let Russia act how she may.”

The *Times* then considered “the point of more immediate urgency in this message, . . . the undisguised exposition presented by it of the policy to be maintained by the United States in respect of South America.” It noticed that Monroe disclaimed “every right or thought of meddling in the disputes of the European powers in matters ‘relating to themselves.’ ” After quoting the clauses relating to the Holy Alliance and intervention in Spanish America, the *Times* interpreted them to mean that the United States would consider such a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition “as a *just cause of war*. This is plain speaking, and it is just thinking. If the free Government of Spain was so dangerous a neighbor to the Bourbons, that they could do no otherwise than put it down in self-defence, how can the jurists of legitimacy blame a kindred alternative on the part of a free power when threatened by the neighborhood of a despot? The President regards the distinct annunciation of this resolute policy so important, that he repeats it towards the close of his message. . . . The President does not fail to remark on the extreme ground of uneasiness afforded to independent States, by the avowed principle on which the invasion of Spain was excused. . . . As for Spain, she is

dismissed with a brief allusion to her weakness, which makes it impossible for her to subdue the infant States. The above declarations, therefore, may be regarded as a friendly counsel to France and her continental Allies."<sup>2</sup>

Other English newspapers praised the message. The *Courier* of December 27 described that state paper as "a bold and manly notice to the Continental Powers," that the United States would treat interposition as "affording a just ground for war." It declared that, after "so clear and explicit a warning," there was not one of the continental powers that would "risk a war with the United States."<sup>3</sup> On January 19, 1824, the *Courier* declared that on great measures of mutual interest England and the United States understood "each other perfectly" and were "upon the best possible footing." It also noticed the non-colonization clause and suggested that this might give "considerable umbrage" to the Russian Government which coolly contemplated turning "the Pacific Ocean into a Russian lake."

In Parliament Mr. Brougham welcomed the tidings in these words: "The question . . . with regard to South America, he believed, was now disposed of, or nearly so; for an event had recently happened, than which no event had ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude, over all the freemen in Europe—an event in which he, as an Englishman, connected by ties of blood and language with America, took peculiar pride

<sup>2</sup> Rush heard that the British packet from New York had been instructed to wait for the message "and bring it over with all speed," Ford, W. C., John Quincy Adams, his Connection with the Monroe Doctrine, 68. No reports of the message were found in the London newspapers before December 26, 27, and 1823. The quotation is from the *Times* of December 27.

<sup>3</sup> A longer quotation is found in McMaster, J. B., A History of the People of the United States, V, 48, note, where the date is erroneously given as December 24. Other interesting quotations from English newspapers are found, *ibid.*, 48-50, note. A most favorable estimate of the influence of the message was given in a dispatch written by Rush to Adams, December 27, 1823, in which it was described as "the most decisive blow to all despotick interference with the new States. . . . On its publicity in London . . . the credit of all the Spanish American securities immediately rose, and the question of the final and complete safety of the new States from all European coercion, is now considered at rest." Ford, W. C., John Quincy Adams, his Connection with the Monroe Doctrine, 68.

and satisfaction—an event, he repeated, had happened, which was decisive on the subject; and that event was the speech and the message of the president of the United States to Congress. The line of policy which that speech disclosed became a great, a free, and an independent nation; and he hoped that his majesty's ministers would be prevented by no mean pride, no paltry jealousy, from following so noble and illustrious an example."<sup>4</sup> It became evident at once that all Englishmen did not understand the message alike. Apparently an interpretation to the effect that Spain had not the right "to recover her own colonial dominions" aroused the foreign minister, George Canning. He declared in the House of Commons that he was "clearly of opinion, with the President of the United States, that no foreign state had a right to interfere, pending the dispute between the colonies and the mother-country; but he was as strongly of opinion, that the mother-country had a right to attempt to recover her colonies if she thought proper."<sup>5</sup>

Canning objected to that part of the message which he thought interdicted "all further colonization on the Continents of America." He asked Rush to explain its meaning.<sup>6</sup> The latter evidently stated that this paragraph was aimed at Russia.<sup>7</sup> The English minister then said that England could not "acknowledge the right of any power to proclaim such a principle, much less to bind other countries to the observance of it. If we were to be repelled from the shores of America, it would not matter to us whether that repulsion were effected by the Ukase of Russia excluding us from the sea; or by the new Doctrine of the President prohibiting us from the land. But we cannot yield obedience to either."<sup>8</sup> Canning objected particularly to

<sup>4</sup> In an address on the king's speech, February 3, 1824, Hansard, T. C., *Parliamentary Debates*, new series, X, 68.

<sup>5</sup> Hansard, T. C., *Parliamentary Debates*, X, 74. See also, *ibid.*, 90, 91, 92; Bagot, J., *George Canning and his Friends*, II, 208. The views of Sir James Mackintosh are also quoted in Moore, J. B., *A Digest of International Law*, VI, 411.

<sup>6</sup> Bagot, J., *George Canning and his Friends*, II, 209; Rush, R., *Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London* (Philadelphia, 1845), 471, 472.

<sup>7</sup> Bagot, J., *George Canning and his Friends*, II, 217.

<sup>8</sup> Reddaway, W. F., *The Monroe Doctrine* (New York, 1905), 92, 93.

the prohibition of colonization by England on the north-west coast of North America; hence Monroe's pronunciamiento soon became a factor in the dispute of England and the United States with Russia over conflicting claims to the north-west coast.<sup>9</sup> It hindered concert of action between the United States and England.<sup>10</sup> Canning even ventured the prediction that England would "have a squabble with the Yankees yet in and about those regions."<sup>11</sup>

The great English minister was evidently chagrined at Monroe's bold assumption of Pan-American leadership. Canning, as a monarchist, believed that the bustling young republic wished to separate democratic America from monarchical Europe; hence, while disclaiming all thoughts of forcible intervention by England,<sup>12</sup> he soon desired, as a counterpoise, to encourage the establishment of monarchies in Latin America. "I have no objection," said Canning, "to monarchy in Mexico—quite otherwise . . . even in the person of a Spanish infanta. . . . Monarchy in Mexico, and monarchy in Brazil would cure the evils of universal democracy . . . "<sup>13</sup> Thus it is

<sup>9</sup> Rush, R., *Memoranda of a Residence*, 597, 598. On February 25, 1824 (O. S.), Henry Middleton, minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, wrote to Adams: "I have reason to believe, too, that insinuations were not wanting to put the most unfavorable construction upon the doctrine we had advanced, and to make it appear as peculiarly directed against Russia. I have been at considerable pains in endeavoring to efface all impressions of that kind, and I let it be distinctly understood, that I should protest in the strongest terms against any delimitation of territory without the participation of the United States. . . . It may be very well understood that a course different from that we are pursuing with regard to Spanish affairs would have pleased better . . . " State Dept. MSS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Despatches from Russia, 10. On February 5/17, 1824, Middleton wrote to Adams in regard to intervention in Spanish America: "The decided tone of the President's Message at the meeting of Congress (which was received here with unprecedented rapidity, having reached St. Petersburg (in the English Gazettes of the 26th December) on the first of January O. S.) is considered generally as having gone far towards deciding the question against interference." *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 460, 461, 463; Bagot, J., *George Canning and his Friends*, II, 218, 219.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 266.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 237; Paxson, F. L., *The Independence of the South-American Republics*, 213.

<sup>13</sup> Stapleton, A. G., *George Canning and his Times*, 394, 395.

hardly an exaggeration to say that the original doctrine of Monroe at times provoked antagonism to the spread of democratic governments in America.

The ministers of Louis XVIII evidently read Monroe's message "with the deepest interest."<sup>14</sup> To the minister of foreign affairs, Viscount Châteaubriand, the principle of non-colonization and the principle of non-intervention were alike distasteful. Châteaubriand even suggested to Sir Charles Stuart, the English ambassador at Paris, "a joint representation to the United States" against "the prohibition of future colonization on the Continents of America."<sup>15</sup> On January 2, 1824, Châteaubriand said to Stuart "that the striking coincidence of the language of the Message to Congress with the communications between His Majesty's Government and the Prince de Polignac, respecting the affairs of the Colonies, almost justified in his mind the supposition that these doctrines were now set forth for the first time by the President, in virtue of an understanding between the British and American Governments." Châteaubriand "thought that a declaration of the principles, upon which the President affects to pronounce that the whole of the New World shall in future be governed, made at a time when the American Government is wholly unable to enforce such pretensions, ought to be resisted by all the Powers possessing either territorial, or commercial, interests in that Hemisphere, and more especially by Great Britain and France, inasmuch as it strikes at the principle of Mediation brought forward by Them both, by peremptorily deciding the question of South American Independence, without listening to the concessions which either of the parties at issue might be disposed to admit. Monsieur de Châteaubriand added that under these circumstances he felt the more confirmed in his opinion, that it will not be expedient to allow a Representative of the United States to participate in any nego-

<sup>14</sup> Stuart to Canning, January 1, 1824, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Correspondence, France, 305.

<sup>15</sup> Stuart to Canning, January 13, 1824, *ibid.* See also Rush, R., *Memoranda of a Residence*, 486, 487.

tiations, which may take place upon the affairs of the Colonies."<sup>16</sup> At a subsequent conference Châteaubriand gave Stuart the impression that he had discarded the notion that England had connived at Monroe's declarations in regard to South America.<sup>17</sup>

Conferences in regard to Spanish America were also held between Châteaubriand and the Duke of San Carlos, Spain's ambassador in Paris. On February 12, 1824, San Carlos reported to the new Spanish secretary of state, the Count of Ofalia, a conference in which Châteaubriand had stated that France wished Spain to decree the freedom of commerce in Spanish America and thus to weaken England's position. San Carlos intimated that the Allies feared that intervention in Spanish America would provoke a war because of the opposition of England.<sup>18</sup> Monroe's message, interpreted to signify a *rapprochement* between England and the United States, evidently had some influence. On February 17, Châteaubriand wrote to the French ambassador at Berlin that both Canning and Monroe had declared that they denied to the continental powers the right of intervention by force of arms in the affairs of the Spanish colonies.<sup>19</sup> This declaration was interpreted by Châteaubriand to mean that, if the Allies intervened in Spanish America, they would have to fight England and perhaps the United States also.<sup>20</sup> Châteaubriand's analysis of European

<sup>16</sup> Stuart to Canning, January 2, 1824, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Correspondence, France, 305, see also Reddaway, W. F., *The Monroe Doctrine*, 94.

<sup>17</sup> Stuart to Canning, January 13, 1824, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Correspondence, France, 305.

<sup>18</sup> Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, 6852. In October, 1823, Canning had boldly announced to the French ambassador in London, Prince Polignac, his unflinching opposition to intervention by force in Spanish America, *British Foreign and State Papers*, I, 49-53; San Carlos to Saez, November 8, 1823, reported a conference with Châteaubriand in which the latter had told him that the news of Canning's attitude had been sent to the ambassadors of France in Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Spain, *Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General*, 5; see also Bagot, J., *George Canning and his Friends*, II, 208, 209.

<sup>19</sup> *Oeuvres Complètes de Châteaubriand*, XII, 419. See further, Bagot, J., *George Canning and his Friends*, II, 207. An American's view of the influence of Monroe's message in France is found in Hamilton, S. M., *Writings of James Monroe*, VI, 432-434.

<sup>20</sup> *Oeuvres Complètes de Châteaubriand*, XII, 419, 426.



politics convinced him that, in such a contingency, France would not get enough support from the Allies to justify a disastrous war: the Holy Alliance would be reduced to France and Russia.<sup>21</sup> The hope of promoting commerce with the Spanish colonies, a desire to retard the recognition of Spanish-American independence by England, and a fear of the English navy were among the motives which governed Châteaubriand.<sup>22</sup> More reluctant to intervene than the foreign minister was the premier, Count Villèle. In vain did the Czar intimate that the Allies should repress the revolt in Spanish America.<sup>23</sup> France did not advocate forcible intervention in Spanish America in the spring and summer of 1824.

The reports of Monroe's message and of its reception in England created a stir in the newspapers of Paris. The chief critic of Monroe was the administration journal, *L'Etoile*; his eloquent champion was *Le Constitutionnel*. On January 1, 1824, *L'Etoile* discussed the message under the headline "Mélanges Politiques." *L'Etoile* said that, according to the excerpts printed in the English newspapers, the message contained "evident contradictions." It affirmed that there was no design in Europe to oppress the Spanish colonists, but rather to release them, like their Spanish brothers, from "the yoke of ambitious and covetous revolutionists." Evidently it particularly objected to the passage concerning the governments *de facto*. "Such a maxim would shake the political system of all Europe and might even expose those professing it to terrible consequences. Suppose indeed that tomorrow an audacious soldier should seize the supreme power in the United States; or that, breaking the bonds of this gigantic federal republic several states should proclaim their independence, what principle would congress then invoke to protest against usurpation or

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 419, 426, 427.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 379, 408, 411, 414, 426; San Carlos wrote to Ofalia, March 25, 1824, that Châteaubriand advised Spain not to exasperate England and thus accelerate the recognition of Spanish America, Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5. On the influence of the sea powers see Chadwick, F. E., *The Relations of the United States and Spain*, Diplomacy, 204.

<sup>23</sup> Martens, F. de, *Traité conclus par la Russie*, XV, 30.

dismemberment?" The complaints of the United States could be answered by their own words: "the usurper rules *de facto*; your former states have ceased *de facto* to belong to you." On January 4, *L'Etoile* also criticized Monroe. It said that Monroe, "who was not a sovereign," but only "the first delegate of the people" had assumed "the tone of a powerful monarch whose armies and fleets were ready to move at the first signal. He has done even more, for he has prescribed to the potentates of Europe the conduct which they ought to observe under certain circumstances if they do not wish to provoke his displeasure." After mentioning the non-colonization clause, it declared: "Mr. Monroe is the temporary president of a republic situated on the eastern coast of North America. That republic is bounded on the south by the possessions of the king of Spain and on the north by the possessions of the king of England. The independence of this republic has been recognized for only forty years. On what title then are the Two Americas from Hudson's Bay to Cape Horn now under its immediate control?" The attitude assumed by Monroe was described as that of "a dictator armed with a right of sovereignty over all of the New World." The message was interpreted to mean that, under Monroe's "political system," Spain could not attempt to reconquer her colonial dominions; the king of Portugal could not freely act as a sovereign and as a father in the empire of Brazil; England could not freely plant new settlements in Canada or New Scotland. Moreover, the message contained "phrases indirectly hostile to the politics and to the ambitions of the great powers of Europe." Lastly, the doctrines of the message were not sanctioned by any authority of the United States; "the opinions of Monroe were as yet only those of a private citizen."

On January 4 *Le Courrier Française* advised "*L'Etoile*, its party, and all the host of fanatics of Europe . . . to restrain the ridiculous manifestations of their wrath." On January 6, the *Times* made a spirited defence of Monroe: "The French Ultra journals are much perplexed by the message of the President to Congress, and by the favorable reception which

(except in one or two contemptible cases) that bold state paper has experienced from the English press. The editors of the *Etoile* manifestly shake in their skins, and writhe under the lash thus inflicted on the plots of their masters against human freedom." The *Times* declared that *L'Etoile* was attempting "to sever the Chief Magistrate of a powerful and enlightened nation, from the body of the state which he represents. 'Not a Sovereign!' No, but he is the acknowledged—the elected head and organ of a great sovereign people—one whose election cost his country neither a drop of blood nor a widow's tear, nor the beggary or banishment, the persecution or corruption of a single human being among ten millions of men."

*Le Constitutionnel* of January 2 defended the message in a remarkable exposition. It declared that the message expressed justice "with simplicity and grandeur." The "wise Monroe" had firmly traced "the limits of the New World. . . . There one reads all that we ceaselessly repeat; there one sees put into practice all the principles which we proclaim; one is impressed with the serenity and the universal good-will which it breathes. To-day for the first time the new continent says to the old 'I am no longer land for occupation; here men are masters of the soil which they occupy, the equals of the people from whom they came, and resolved not to treat with them except on the basis of the most exact justice.' The new continent is right." This journal believed the great principle of the message to be that the Americas were no longer open to colonization: "America has legitimate possessors from the Pole to Cape Horn." This principle was interpreted to mean that Monroe recognized the right of European nations to colonies in America while the settlers were under the tutelage of the mother-country. But when the colonists became mature and exercised their rights and powers they became members of the "new American family." The declarations of Monroe in regard to the governments *de facto* were interpreted to mean that, if a colony warred with the mother-country, the older American states would not intervene until the rising state had demonstrated by force its right to emancipation. But if the European continent, "proud of its

former supremacy," proposed to take up arms against a colony, then American neutrality would cease, the struggle would no longer be "the cause of the mother-country with a colony, it would be the quarrel of a continent with a continent; the United States would see their independence compromised and they could not remain peaceable spectators of such subversion of all rights. The anti-revolutionary system has traversed all Europe, it has broken down the Alps and the Pyrenees in the two peninsulas, it has touched the columns of Hercules, and it now needs only to cross the ocean to accomplish the reconstruction of the past and to revoke all enfranchisements; but the freedmen are members of a nation and they declare to Old Europe that she shall not cross the sea to replace the yoke of former domination. The oldest sons declare that they join their younger brothers, and, if anyone wishes to attack them, they announce that the United States will oppose it, because they are all brothers with a common origin and with the same cause."

The non-colonization principle *per se* was hardly given as much attention in the newspapers of Paris as in those of London. On January 24, 1824, the *Journal des Débats* printed a letter which discussed the conflicting claims to the north-west coast of America and the message of Monroe. The *Journal* merely called the attention of its readers to the rights of Spain.

Monroe's message reached Spain in January, 1824, when the reactionary policy of the absolute king, Ferdinand VII, was approaching a climax in the terrible days of Calomarde. The clauses of the message which dealt with Spanish America naturally attracted the attention of a few officials of the government. The Spanish consul at Gibraltar interpreted the news, which he gleaned from American newspapers, to mean that the United States would object even to the interference of Spain with the states whose independence they had acknowledged.<sup>24</sup> Letters to Madrid from the Spanish consul at New York, Francis Stoughton, in which he described the message as "a political manœuvre to check European powers and to

<sup>24</sup> J. G. de Rivas to the Marquis of Casa Yrujo, January 5, 1824. Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, 5625.

flatter the vanity of the American people," were quietly filed with the documents concerning the pacification of America.<sup>25</sup> Stoughton's letter of December 16, 1823, however, which contained an editorial on the message from the *National Gazette*, that the consul deemed inspired, bears this comment, evidently written by an official in the Spanish department of state: "Add this letter to the papers concerning the negotiations which are being carried on in regard to America. Send an accurate translation of the annexed article to the ministers of his Catholic Majesty at the courts of the Allies so that they may know the scope of the views of the government of the United States in regard to the affairs of America which is in opposition not to the views of Spain in particular, but to those of Europe."<sup>26</sup>

Hugh Nelson, the minister of the United States in Spain, described the reception of Monroe's message at the court of Madrid in a despatch of January 16, 1824:

"The Message of the President of the United States reach'd us thro' France a few days since: at first, in extracts, publish'd in the French Papers—and afterwards in the entire form published in Gallignani's Messenger. It appears, from what we learn, to have excited surprise, and indeed astonishment in many of the Diplomatic Corps. But they speak yet in the most cautious and guarded manner. It was remarked by one of them to Mr. Appleton, that it had given the death blow to the proposed Congress at Paris for adjusting South American Affairs. Since the arrival of the extracts from the Message in the French papers, Mr. A— has also had an interview with one in the secrets of the great Northern Power, who spoke of it in the most guarded manner—but complimented the astuteness and sagacity of the President, as manifested in this State Paper. Of its effects on this Govt. we hear nothing. I attended yesterday at the King's Levee with the other Foreign Ministers,

<sup>25</sup> Stoughton wrote letters in regard to Monroe's message to the Marquis of Casa Yrujo on December 4 and December 6, 1823, and January 2, 1824; the quotation is from the letter of January 2, Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

but I found the deportment of the Monarch and the Royal family in perfect harmony with their former behaviour—precisely as if no such State paper existed—and as if they had no knowledge of it. After the Levee was over, I waited upon the Count of Ofalia (Narcisso Heredia) still exercising *ad interim* the functions of First Minister of State, who received me with the complacency, which he always manifests in my visits—and as usual spoke of our Country, the persons and things in it with apparent pleasure. I waited some time expecting that he would touch upon the subject of the Message—but he said nothing of it—Nor did I think proper to introduce it as a subject of conversation.”<sup>27</sup>

Nevertheless, Ofalia was spurred on by the news, for on January 17, 1824, he instructed San Carlos to undertake a special mission to London where he was to use his influence against the recognition of Spanish-American independence by England.<sup>28</sup> This mission was suspended, however, when England declined Spain’s invitation to attend a European congress on the affairs of Spanish America.<sup>29</sup> But Ferdinand did not falter in his determination to plant the banner of Castile on the summit of Chapultepec. Shortly after Monroe’s message reached Madrid, the king recalled the envoys commissioned by the constitutional government to pacify the insurgent provinces from Mexico to Patagonia. The actions of these commissioners, some of whom had actually signed a preliminary treaty of peace with the insurgents of Buenos Aires, were declared null.<sup>30</sup> To Ferdinand, who wished to be in fact the king of Spain and the

<sup>27</sup> Nelson to Adams, January 16, 1824, State Department MSS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Despatches from Ministers, Spain, 23. Mr. Appleton had been acting as Chargé d’Affaires *ad interim* for the United States before the arrival of Nelson at Madrid.

<sup>28</sup> Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, 6852.

<sup>29</sup> Ofalia to the Duke of San Carlos, February 23, 1824, *ibid.* England’s reply is in the British and Foreign State Papers, XI, 58–63. In December, 1823, Ferdinand VII had issued an invitation to the Allies and to England to attend this congress, *ibid.*, 49–53.

<sup>30</sup> British and Foreign State Papers, XI, 865. The treaty with Buenos Aires is found in Registro Oficial de la República Argentina, II, 41, 42.

Indies, Monroe's manifesto was not a flaming sword at the gateway to the New World.

In Austria prominent publicists were startled by the news from America. On January 13, 1824, the Austrian councillor of state, Friedrich von Gentz, was moved to write this instructive comment: "The message of the President of the United States is an epoch-making act in the history of our times. Every line of it deserves to be considered with the most earnest attention. Not only the present attitude of that mighty and productive federation towards Europe, but also the relation of both American continents to the Old World are here enunciated with a clarity and a precision which end all doubts and duplicities.

"The separation of America from Europe has been completed irrevocably. If the reconquest of the colonies on the continent or their voluntary return to the old rule had not already become impossible, this opposition of the North American people, which has so long been developed and which has only now been openly declared would alone be sufficient to banish all thoughts of it. At present it is not a question of the islands; the United States themselves feel that they dare not as yet carry their presumption so far; and very probably they foresee that the rule of the European countries over Cuba, Jamaica, Martinique, and other islands will not last much longer without their assistance.

"May this view of the affair which has now been revealed to us, early incite great statesmen to consider carefully and profoundly what must be done with that new transatlantic colossus which was formed from such dangerous, hostile elements, not so much because of the material safety of Europe (for this cannot be menaced from that quarter for the next fifty or one hundred years) as for the moral and political preservation of the Old World upon its present basis. . . .

"With regard to the policy of the cabinets in the questions pending, it seems to me a real gain that the conviction of the impossibility of working on the American continent with the idea of re-establishing the old régime has been so emphatically confirmed by the North-American protestations." Gentz

maintained that the European courts in considering Spain's relations to her former colonies should recognize the fact that "nothing positive may henceforth be attempted on the American continent by European powers—that Spain herself is in no condition to subjugate anew any of the colonies—and, that, in the present situation, after a deliberate examination of the inevitable results of the undertaking, no other power will venture to co-operate—that the titular sovereignty over these colonies can never be used by Spain for any real gain."<sup>31</sup>

The English ambassador at Vienna thus described the comment of Prince Metternich: "He said, that it was in exact conformity with the republican Principles, avowed and constantly acted upon by that Government, but that the opinions and intentions therein announced afforded additional grounds for not allowing an Agent from the United States to assist at Conferences which would have for their object the re-establishing by amicable means, some kind of connection between Spain and her Colonies.

"This Speech, he said, had confirmed him in an opinion he had before entertained, that great calamities would be brought upon Europe by the establishment of these vast republics in the New World, in addition to the power of the United States, of whose views no man could entertain a doubt after reading the Speech in question. He did not say that the present race would witness these calamities, but it was one of the first duties of a Government to direct its views to the welfare of Posterity, and however remote the danger which he apprehended might be, it was still the duty of every European Statesman to give it due consideration in forming his judgment upon this most important Question.

"He held it, he said, to be impossible that any of the European powers could be of opinion, (their commercial interests being secured) that the independence of America could be desirable, although circumstances might compel them to acquiesce in it.

"He condemned as usual, the folly of the Spanish Govern-

<sup>31</sup> Ungedruckte Denkschriften, Tagebücher und Briefe von Friedrich von Gentz, 102-105.



ment in cherishing the hope of being enabled to re-establish their former ascendancy over the Colonies, but he could not but think that it would be highly advantageous to Europe, if, (what he called), '*Le principe Monarchique*' could be preserved, by vesting in his Catholic Majesty a nominal authority over those possessions, or by constituting them independent Monarchies in the persons of Individuals of the Spanish Royal Family."<sup>32</sup>

Metternich was not the only publicist who still thought of influencing the destinies of the states rising beyond the Atlantic. About the same time, his friend Gentz also dreamed that a congress of the Allies might appropriately consider an adjustment of the relations between independent Spanish America and the mother-country.<sup>33</sup> A few months later Ferdinand VII—evidently hoping to regain his glorious heritage—again vainly solicited England to attend a congress on Spanish-American affairs.<sup>34</sup> Of this invitation Canning said: "The voice is the voice of Ofalia, but the hand is the hand of Pozzo. . . ." <sup>35</sup> Russia was the Don Quixote of the Holy Alliance; the Czar could not persuade even France to support forcible intervention in Spanish America.<sup>36</sup> France now leaned towards England, for the new foreign minister, Count Villèle, soon corresponded with Canning in regard to monarchies in Spanish America.<sup>37</sup> When

<sup>32</sup> Sir Henry Wellesley to Canning, January 21, 1824, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Correspondence, Austria, 182. Metternich's views on Monroe's message are merely suggested in Aus Metternich's Nachgelassenen Papieren, II, part 2, 90.

<sup>33</sup> Ungedruckte Denkschriften, Tagebücher und Briefe von Friedrich von Gentz, 105-112.

<sup>34</sup> British and Foreign State Papers, XII, 958-962. On June 14, 1824, Sir William A' Court sent to Ofalia a copy of Canning's note of May 17, 1824, in which England again declined to attend a congress on Spanish-American affairs, Archivo General de Indias, Estado, América en General, 5.

<sup>35</sup> Bagot, J., George Canning and his Friends, II, 240. Russia had sent her ambassador Pozzo di Borgo from Paris to Madrid on an extraordinary mission.

<sup>36</sup> San Carlos to Ofalia, April 20, 1824, reported conferences with the ministers of the Allies in Paris in regard to Spanish America. San Carlos stated that Russia wished to know Spain's plans, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, 6852. On the relations of France and Russia at this time see Martens, F. de, *Traité conclus par la Russie*, XV, 30-33.

<sup>37</sup> Stapleton, E. J., *Some Official Correspondence of George Canning*, 1, 247, 248. Châteaubriand's plea to Canning in January, 1824, is found *ibid.*, 139-144.

Canning won the fight in his cabinet for the recognition of Spanish-American independence—an act which he fondly hoped would make Spanish America “English,”<sup>38</sup> and thus thwart the ambitions of the Republic of the West—he gave an intimate friend this exposé of his new American policy:

“The thing is done. . . . The Yankees will shout in triumph; but it is they who lose most by our decision. The great danger of the time—a danger which the policy of the European System would have fostered—was a division of the World into European and American, Republican and Monarchical; a league of worn-out Govts. on the one hand, and of youthful and stirring Nations, with the U. States at their head, on the other. *We* slip in between; and plant ourselves in Mexico. The Un. States have gotten the start of us in vain; and we link once more America to Europe.”<sup>39</sup>

The fortunes of Spanish America at this conjuncture were thus affected by various events: American, European, national, international. The rumor of armed intervention in Spanish America which reached statesmen of the New World was not entirely a hoax. The principle of non-intervention announced in Monroe’s response was praised by many European journalists, while Canning and Châteaubriand protested against the principle of non-colonization. One or the other of these principles provoked the criticism of certain statesmen and editors at once. No contemporary suggestion has been found for the familiar name, “the Monroe Doctrine”: it was called a “line of policy,” a “doctrine”; Canning christened it “the new Doctrine of the President.” Although this doctrine cooled the ardor of some advocates of an Hispanic congress, yet it did not banish from European minds all thoughts of interference under the sunny sky of South America. Even in its primitive form, the doctrine of Monroe suggested perplexing problems of interpretation to European journalists and publicists. In the opinion of the

<sup>38</sup> Stapleton, A. G., George Canning and his Times, 411.

<sup>39</sup> Canning to Frere, January 8, 1825, in Festing, G., John Hookham Frere and his Friends, 267, 268. On “The Later American Policy of George Canning,” see Temperley, H. W. V., in the American Historical Review, XI, 779-797.

writer, some historians have misunderstood or have over-emphasized the contemporaneous influence of Monroe's message. For example, that declaration of policy did not necessarily influence in favor of the United States the negotiations pending in regard to the north-west coast of North America. Further, that declaration was only one of the forces which affected the new American family of states for good or evil. The influence which that pronunciamiento exerted in favor of the autonomy of Spanish America in 1823 and 1824 often acted in common with other influences. It was affected by the growing consciousness that this magnificent empire had split into states which had virtually established their independence; naturally it was linked to the recognition of Spanish American independence by the United States; it could hardly be dissociated from the pervasive influence of England, which sprang from the "dear-bought glories of Trafalgar's day." America's *Zeitgeist* even awoke a spirit of apprehension or of antagonism in Europe: some publicists now conceived the United States to be a new weight cast into the scales of European politics; prominent statesmen had visions of menacing democracies in America, the New World ranged against the Old. Metternich and Canning even thought of encouraging monarchies in Latin America. This policy—which Canning hoped would prevent the hegemony of the United States in America—indicates the difficulty of drawing a demarcation line between Europe and America in an era distinguished by inter-hemispherical influences. While the doctrine announced by President Monroe under the particular circumstances which called forth its utterance was one of many influences acting for the autonomy of Spanish America, the notion that it was a dominant influence acting favorably to the destinies of the Hispanic states in America is erroneous.